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the sacrifice of privacy is necessary-those where the investigations con-
cern a specific breach of the law."
In view of the trend toward increased governmental control of business,
and the need for quick and efficient investigation if control is to be effec-
tive, only the procedural requirements for reasonable search and seizure
are likely in the future to be prominent in litigation. The question of
relevance will probably, as a matter of expediency, be left primarily to
the discretion of the administrator. Thus, in the instant case, the adminis-
trator sought records which included information about employees engaged
solely in intrastate commerce and others who were exempt from the provi-
sions of the Act.10 Since the administrator is charged with the classification
of employees, the Court decided that the information was necessary for
the proper enforcement of his duties.
The effective execution of social policies involving the control of busi-
ness depends upon the accessibility of pertinent information. Experience
has shown that, generally, testimony and documents can be effectively se-
cured under proper safeguards by administrative means. Whatever hard-
ships may be imposed on individuals by such administrative demands for
information are outweighed by considerations of the public interest in the
more effective enforcement of the social policy."
L. E. M.
COPYRGHT-DEDICATION TO THE PUBLIC-LEGENDs ON PHONOGRAPH REC-
oRDs-[Federal].-Paul Whiteman and his orchestra made a number of
phonograph recordings. The records which were ultimately sold to the
public bore the legend: "Not licensed for radio broadcast." This was even-
tually changed to " * * * only for non-commercial use on phonographs in
homes. Manufacturer and original purchaser have agreed this record shall
not be sold or used for any other purposes * * *." A distributor purchased
these records from the manufacturer, and sold them to a radio station which
broadcast them in total disregard of the legends. The manufacturer sued
to enjoin the radio station from broadcasting the records., Held: Injunction
denied. Assuming that Whiteman and the manufacturer had "common law"
property in the recordings (the former as to his performance, the latter as
to the skill and art necessary for a good recording), the sale of the records
was absolute and unconditional in spite of the legend. 1?. C. A. Manufac-
tu7ing Co. v. Whiternan.2
10. (1938) 52 Stat. 1067, c. 676, see. 13, 29 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940)
sec. 213.
11. See Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson (1894) 154 U. S. 447,
474; Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testi-
mony (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 694, 720 et seq.; Handler, The Constitu-
tionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission (1928) 28
Col. L. Rev. 905, 933 et seq.
1. The manufacturer also asked that Whiteman be adjudged to have no
interest in the records of his performance.
2. (C. C. A. 2, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 86.
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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The court's assumption that a performer has property in his perform-
ance was based on a recognized common law doctrine.3 This interest in
performance, however, is not protected by the Copyright Act. At common
law the performer lost his interest by a general publication,4 but might
retain his vital rights by publishing "restrictively."5 The court in the in-
stant case followed the settled rule that, where there is a general publica-
tion in fact, express words of restriction are inoperative.6
Not all courts have agreed with the result of the principal case. The
legend, "not licensed for radio broadcast," has been held a valid restric-
tion limiting publication7 The notice, "this record only to be used on
Ford Motor Program," has also been held a valid limitation on distribu-
tion.8 Prior to the invention of the phonograph and the sound film, an
artist's performance ran little danger of identical reproduction, though it
might be the subject of mimicry. Broadcasts by an ultimate purchaser,
however, reproduce a single rendition and may reduce the demand for
records, curtailing the artist's royalties and the manufacturer's sales. In
this way the broadcaster may be competing with the artist and manufac-
turer in supplying a particular commodity to the public. Certainly the
decision in the instant case does not extend the trend of earlier cases pro-
tecting artists in their performance. It also fails to follow the spirit of
the Supreme Court's decision in International News Service v. Associated
Press,9 where the Court held that competing news agencies' news was to
3. Waring v. Dunlea (D. C. E. D. N. C. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 338; Aronson
v. Baker (1887) 43 N. J. Eq. 365; Fleron v. Lackaye (S. Ct. 1891) 14
N. Y. S. 292; Waring v. WDAS (1937) 327 Pa. 433, 194 AtI. 631.
4. Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914)
212 Fed. 301, 303; Moore v. Ford Motor Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1930) 43 F. (2d)
685, aff'g (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 529; D'Ole v. Kansas City
Star (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1899) 94 Fed. 840, 844; Baker v. Libbie (1912)
210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E. 109; Jewelers' Merc. Agency, Ltd. v. Jewelers'
Weekly Publ. Co. (1898) 155 N. Y. 241.
5. Press Publ. Co. v. Monroe (C. C. A. 2, 1896) 73 Fed. 196, 51 L. R. A.
353; Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1904) 134
Fed. 321; McCarthy & Fischer v. White (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1919) 259
Fed. 364; Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. (D. C. D. Mass. 1936)
8 F. Supp. 358, modified in (C. C. A. 1, 1936) 81 F. (2d) 373, cert. denied
(1935) 298 U. S. 670; Bartlett v. Crittenden (C. C. D. Ohio 1849) Fed.
Cas. No. 1,076; Chamber of Commerce v. Wells (1907) 100 Minn. 205, 111
N. W. 157.
6. In Chamber of Commerce v. Wells (1907) 100 Minn. 205, 111 N. W.
157, 159, the court said: "If there be in fact a publication of a character
to enable the public, without fraud or collusion, to obtain the information,
the property rights in the literary or other like production ceases, without
regard to the intention of the owner." Ladd v. Oxnard (C. C. D. Mass.
1896) 75 Fed. 703; Larowe-Loisette v. O'Laughlin (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1898)
88 Fed. 896; Wagner v. Conried (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1903) 125 Fed. 798;
Savage v. Hoffman (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1908) 159 Fed. 584; Jewelers' Merc.
Agency, Ltd. v. Jewelers' Weekly Publ. Co. (1898) 155 N. Y. 241. See the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in International News Service v.
Associated Press (1918) 248 U. S. 215, 248.
7. Waring v. WDAS (1937) 327 Pa. 452, 194 Ati. 640.
8. Waring v. Dunlea (D. C. E. D. N. C. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 338.
9. (1918) 248 U. S. 215.
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be considered "quasi-property," and hence protected, irrespective of the
rights as against the general public.
The inconvenience of conflicting decisions is obvious against a back-
ground of national chain broadcasting. Congressional action seems the only
expedient way to uniformity. An amendment to the Copyright Act, whereby
performers would be protected in their recorded renditions by regular statu-
tory copyright, or a declaration that limiting legends do or do not restrict
publication, would provide the desired certainty. R. W. K.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ANNULMIENT-CONCEALMENT OF VENEREAL Dis-
EASE-[Missouri] .- Plaintiff, upon proposing marriage to defendant, asked
about the condition of her health. Defendant, knowing that she had a
venereal disease assured plaintiff that there was nothing the matter with
her. Some time after the marriage a doctor examined defendant and found
that she had syphilis. Plaintiff then brought suit to have the marriage an-
nulled. Held: Defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment
was ground for annulment of the marriage. Watson v. Watson.1
Fraud is the basis for annulment of marriage because of concealment
of a venereal disease. The majority (or "Massachusetts") rule2 requires
that fraud relied upon as a ground for annulment go to the "essentials"
of the marriage contract.3 The "essentials" of the contract include the
legalization of sexual relations and the procreation of children; hence any-
thing which was fraudulently concealed and which makes natural sexual
intercourse impossible is ground for annulment.4 Prior to 1903 New York
followed the Massachusetts rule.5 But in 1903, in Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo,o
the New York Court adopted a rule more favorable to annulment. It held
that if consent to the marriage is given in reliance on a misrepresentation
which would deceive an ordinarily prudent person, the marriage will be
annulled. Thus in New York the fraud need go merely to the giving of the
1. (Mo. App. 1940) 143 S. W. (2d) 349.
2. Vanneman, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud (1925) 9 Minn. L.
Rev. 497.
3. Reynolds v. Reynolds (Mass. 1862) 85 Allen 605; Foss v. Foss (Mass.
1866) 94 Allen 26; Hanson v. Hanson (1934) 287 Mass. 154, 191 N. E.
673, 93 A. L. R. 701.
4. Huberich, Venereal Disease in the Law of Marriage and Divorce
(1903) 37 Am. L. Rev. 226. In two cases the Massachusetts Court said that
if the marriage were consummated it would not grant annulment. Smith v.
Smith (1898) 171 Mass. 404, 50 N. E. 933, 41 L. R. A. 800, 68 Am. St.
Rep. 440; Vondal v. Vondal (1900) 175 Mass. 383, 56 N. E. 586, 78 Am.
St. Rep. 502. But there seems to be some doubt whether this is really the
Massachusetts law. A note, in (1920) 5 A. L. R. 1016, 1023, points out
that in the Vondal case, where the court said no annulment would be
granted where a marriage was consummated, the disease was curable, while
in the Smith case, in which an unconsummated marriage was annulled, the
disease was incurable. As yet no case of a consummated marriage in which
the disease is incurable has arisen.
5. Clarke v. Clarke (N. Y. 1860) 11 Abb. Pr. 228.
6. (1903) 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63, 63 L. R. A. 92, 95 Am. St. Rep.
609.
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